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Robert S. Chirinko and Daniel J. Wilson
Job Creation Tax Credits:
Still Worth Consideration? 
The economic wreckage from the 
Great Recession has been cleared away 
from many sectors of the economy. 
The stock market has risen to record 
highs, corporate profi t margins have 
rebounded smartly, and housing markets 
have recovered in many parts of the 
country. Yet progress in the labor market 
remains unacceptable. Although the 
unemployment rate has declined from 9.6 
percent at the depths of the downturn to 
6.3 percent at the time of this writing, it 
is still historically high for this stage of 
an expansion, and it masks the stubbornly 
low employment rate of 59.1 percent. 
In addition to monetary and fi scal 
initiatives to stimulate the economy and 
job creation, the Obama administration in 
2011 advanced a job creation tax credit 
(JCTC) designed to directly stimulate 
labor demand. While there are many 
varieties of JCTCs, the common element 
is that, by undertaking certain hiring 
decisions, a fi rm receives a credit that 
lowers its tax bill. In 2010, a JCTC was 
part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore 
Employment (HIRE) Act. Only jobs 
created from the pool of unemployed 
workers qualifi ed for this narrow-based 
credit of 6.2 percent of wages paid over 
52 consecutive weeks of employment. 
(The HIRE Act also contained a Social 
Security tax exemption for employers.) 
Discussions continued in the midst of 
the slow recovery in the labor market. 
A second JCTC was part of President 
Obama’s 2011 proposed American Jobs 
Act. This policy initiative offered a tax 
credit of $4,000 for hiring long-term 
unemployed workers. Bartik and Bishop 
argued in 2009 that a “well-designed 
temporary federal job creation tax credit 
should be an integral part of the effort 
to boost job growth.” Blinder (2013) 
wrote that “[v]irtually since the Great 
Recession began, many economists have 
suggested offering businesses a tax credit 
for creating new jobs. While details 
matter, the basic idea is straightforward: 
Offer tax breaks to fi rms that boost their 
payrolls.” 
Such discussions lead to two questions: 
1) are JCTCs of the sort proposed by 
President Obama likely to be effective in 
reducing unemployment, and 2) are they 
likely to be effi cient in terms of the cost to 
the government for creating a new job? 
 The Experiences of U.S. States
While JCTCs can take many forms, 
we are interested in a “broad-based” 
tax credit, in the sense that it applies to 
employers in a wide range of industries 
without substantial non-employment-
based requirements. Broad-based JCTCs 
have been tried only once before at the 
U.S. federal level: the New Jobs Tax 
Credit, from 1977 to 1978. Although 
the federal government’s experience 
with these JCTCs is quite limited, many 
states have pursued this policy. Our 
research uses the states’ experiences to 
shed light on the two questions about the 
effectiveness and effi ciency of JCTCs.
Nearly half of the states have enacted 
permanent, broad-based JCTCs over the 
past 20 years. The fi rst of these credits 
was adopted in late 1992 and, by August 
2009, 23 states had adopted such a tax 
credit (see Figure 1). The plurality of 
JCTC states are in the eastern United 
States, but there are also many in the 
Midwest and the South. 
The design of these JCTCs varies 
among states. Three will be noted here. 
First, JCTCs are described by two key 
dates: the signing date on which the 
legislation is signed into law by the 
state’s governor, and the qualifying date 
on and after which net new hires by an 
in-state employer qualify for the credit. 
For some states, the dates are very close 
together or the qualifying date is before 
the signing date. We label such states as 
immediate states. Alternatively, when the 
qualifying date occurs after the signing 
date, we label these states as delayed 
states. This distinction is important if we 
are to get the “true” response to a JCTC. 
Second, tax credits are intended to 
subsidize net job creation by businesses 
by expanding a business’ total level of 
employment. With all but one of the state 
JCTCs examined in this study, a fi rm can 
only claim the credit if the number of 
jobs and/or total wages associated with 
new jobs are above specifi ed thresholds. 
(There may be other requirements, 
such as providing health insurance.) 
Moreover, in order to target net job 
creation instead of gross job creation, 
the thresholds are defi ned in terms of a 
“rolling base.” For example, if a fi rm has 
had 100 workers on its payroll over the 
past year, its threshold is 100. If it now 
hires an additional worker, a tax credit 
is given for this one hire. Next year, the 
threshold rises to 101, and tax credits will 
be extended if the number of employees 
equals 102 or greater. 
Third, the monetary value of the 
JCTCs varies substantially among states. 
A particular challenge to our research 
was “translating” the enabling legislation 
into an economic variable amenable to 
traditional economic analysis, which we 
discuss next. 
Lessons from Theory
Using the traditional tools of 
economic analysis, we analyze how a 
fi rm interested in maximizing profi ts 
will react to a JCTC. This analysis yields 
three hypotheses:
1) The following channels of infl uence 
link the legislation to employment: 
enabling legislation  creation of 
a JCTC  economic value of the 
JCTC  lower wage costs  more 
employment. Thus, during months 
at and after which fi rms qualify 
for the JCTC, we would expect 
employment to increase. 
Nearly half of the states have 
enacted permanent, broad-based 
JCTCs over the past 20 years.
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2) For fi rms in states with a delayed 
JCTC, the rolling base initially 
creates a perverse effect. Employers 
can perfectly anticipate the 
forthcoming decline in the net-of-
tax-credit wage and hence have 
an incentive to initially decrease 
employment and meet sales by 
drawing down inventories before 
the qualifying date. Inventories 
will be replenished and hiring 
resumed after fi rms qualify for 
the credit in subsequent months. 
We refer to this potential negative 
effect on employment during 
the implementation period as an 
“anticipatory dip.” 
3) A consequence of the anticipatory 
dip is that fi rms in states with 
delayed JCTCs will have a larger 
employment gain in the month in 
which fi rms qualify for the tax credit 
than fi rms in states with immediate 
JCTC. This difference is due to the 
need of fi rms in the delayed JCTC 
states to replenish inventories and 
rebuild the workforce that was 
reduced because of the anticipatory 
dip. An important consequence 
of this pattern is that, in order to 
estimate the “true” incentive effect 
of the JCTC, we should examine 
the results for fi rms in states with 
immediate JCTCs.
Our theoretical analysis yields 
several other results. The most important 
insight for our empirical analysis is 
that the rolling base feature of JCTCs 
dramatically reduces the impact of the 
tax credit program. The JCTC is based on 
the salary in the fi rst year; however, the 
programs require that position be held for 
a long period of time. In making hiring 
decisions, the fi rm compares the one-
time incentive from the JCTC program 
to the wage bill over a long time horizon. 
If the time horizon is suffi ciently long, 
a 10 percent tax credit, for example, is 
dramatically reduced by a factor of 20 to 
only 0.5 percent. This latter effect is what 
infl uences fi rms and enters our empirical 
analysis, to which we now turn. 
Empirical Results
The empirical work reported here is 
based on monthly, seasonally adjusted 
employment data for private nonfarm 
businesses for the period January 1990 
to December 2007.1 We analyze our state 
panel data as an event study, where the 
event is the month in which fi rms in a 
given state can receive the tax credit. 
The analysis takes into account various 
factors that might infl uence employment.
Our empirical results are largely 
consistent with our three hypotheses. We 
begin by representing the effect of the 
JCTC as an indicator (dummy) variable, 
taking a value of 1 in those months where 
we expect a JCTC effect and 0 in other 
months. We fi nd that immediate JCTC 
states have a positive and statistically 
signifi cant response to the tax credit. 
However, for delayed JCTC states, the 
overall effect is surprisingly negative.
These results are sensitive to the 
length of the interval after the qualifying 
date over which we evaluate the JCTC. 
When this interval is lengthened from 
two to four years, the cumulative 
responses become much larger and 
positive, though still statistically 
insignifi cant. Thus, we have weak 
evidence for Hypothesis 1 and stronger 
evidence that it takes a signifi cant 
period of time for fi rms to respond to 
the tax incentive. Regarding Hypothesis 
2, we document an anticipatory dip in 
delayed states. For fi rms in these states, 
employment falls during the months on or 
after the legislation is signed but before 
fi rms are qualifi ed to receive tax credits. 
The data also support Hypothesis 3. For 
the month in which fi rms are qualifi ed 
to receive tax credits, the response in 
delayed states is twice as large as for 
immediate states. 
These results treat each JCTC equally, 
an assumption that is not warranted 
given the variation in the size of the 
JCTC incentives by different states. We 
reexamine these relations multiplying the 
JCTC indicator variable by a measure 
of the economic impact of the stimulus, 
which accounts for both the size of 
the legislated rate and the adjustment 
needed to refl ect the rolling base. After 
undertaking other analyses to explore the 
effects of some factors that may lead to 
different interpretations of our empirical 
results, our general conclusion is that, 
for immediate states, JCTCs matter for 
employment growth. 
Figure 1  States That Have a JCTC as of 2009
 The rolling base feature 
of JCTCs dramatically 
reduces the impact of the 
tax credit program.
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As mentioned earlier, we believe that 
the immediate states provide the best 
“experiments” for assessing the JCTC. 
Our empirical results can be summarized 
in terms of an elasticity, the percentage 
change in employment for a 1 percent 
change in the net-of-tax-credit wage 
rate induced by a JCTC. Our preferred 
elasticity estimate is 0.30, a fi gure that is 
very much in line with estimates in other 
parts of the labor economics literature. 
Assessing the Effects of a JCTC
 With this estimated elasticity, we 
are now in a position to address the 
question of whether a JCTC is likely to 
be effective and effi cient. In particular, 
we assess the impact of the 2011 Obama 
proposal of a $4,000 federal JCTC for 
long-term unemployed workers. For 
the average worker, this corresponds 
to about a 10 percent reduction in one 
year’s wages. However, the effective 
JCTC is the product of this change, 
the adjustment for the rolling base 
aspect of the state JCTCs in our sample 
(0.065), and eligibility of fi rms for 
the JCTC program (0.94). Thus, the 
effective decline in wage costs is 0.6 
percent. Multiplying this fi gure by our 
elasticity of 0.30, we obtain an increase 
in employment of 0.2 percent, which 
corresponds to about 280,000 workers, 
or a reduction in the unemployment rate 
of 0.2 percentage points; for example, 
from 6.3 to 6.1 percent. Comparable 
calculations indicate that the employment 
rate would rise by only 0.1 percentage 
point. The likely outcome might be a bit 
larger, since the average wage for the 
long-term unemployed is probably less 
than the average wage for all workers, 
thus boosting the impact of the credit 
upward from 10 percent. Nonetheless, the 
estimates suggest that the JCTC proposal 
is not likely to be effective in markedly 
lowering the unemployment rate or 
raising the employment rate. 
An important factor in determining 
this modest effect is that the policy 
initiative is relatively small because of 
the rolling base feature or, equivalently, 
because a reduction in one year’s 
wages is very small when compared to 
the total wage cost over the expected 
employment relationship. Moreover, 
the cost to the government of creating 
these new jobs will be small as well. 
To explore this cost-per-job, we use our 
estimated elasticity of 0.30, set aside 
any considerations of multiplier effects, 
and make some additional assumptions: 
the number of jobs that generate tax 
credits even though they would have 
been created without the JCTC (the 
smaller this “inframarginal” job growth, 
the lower the cost per job); and the 
percentage of eligible fi rms that use the 
tax credit (the lower this take-up rate, 
the lower the “leakage” of subsidies 
to inframarginal job growth). Our 
computations suggest that the cost-per-
job will be about $27,000.2 This fi gure 
is much lower than many found in the 
literature. For example, most estimates 
of the cost-per-job created by federal 
spending policies during the Great 
Recession exceed $100,000. 
Conclusion and an 
Interesting Exception 
Our study has explored the 
effectiveness and effi ciency of adopting 
a federal JCTC through the lens of the 
experiences of U.S. states. Based on our 
analysis, we conclude that the program 
would not be very effective in lowering 
the headline unemployment rate or 
raising the less noticed employment 
rate. We have identifi ed a reason for this 
modest effect—the rolling base feature of 
the JCTC substantially lowers the subsidy 
to employment, but it also lowers the cost 
to government. On balance, JCTC would 
appear to be effi cient in terms of the cost 
per job ranging from $21,000 to $27,000. 
All states but one have adopted a rolling 
base in implementing their JCTCs. For 
the period 1995–1997, Rhode Island 
adopted a temporary JCTC with a fi xed 
base, which removes the dampening 
effect with the rolling base identifi ed 
in our theoretical work. The temporary 
nature of the credit forces fi rms to 
accelerate any hiring plans. Given that we 
have only one data point for this special 
case, we can just report that the tax credit 
of 20 percent was associated with an 
employment elasticity of 0.9, three times 
larger than the one reported in our results 
for other states. The cost per job created 
is $9,000. Relative to the permanent 
credits studied above, the Rhode Island 
JCTC is both more effective and more 
cost effi cient. 
Bartik and Bishop (2009) have 
undertaken a detailed simulation exercise 
of a temporary JCTC valued at 15 percent 
of the wage cost of new employment 
in 2010 and 10 percent in 2011. They 
conclude that this JCTC program would 
create 5.1 million jobs over the two-
year period at a cost per job of $37,000 
without spillover effects and $5,400 
when the resulting higher tax revenues 
and lower spending are considered. These 
calculations, coupled with the Rhode 
Island experience, are tantalizing and 
surely deserve further consideration from 
policymakers. 
Notes
 
The views expressed in this article remain 
the sole responsibility of the authors, and 
the conclusions do not necessarily refl ect the 
views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco or the Federal Reserve System. 
1. The earlier date is the fi rst month in 
which these data are published. The latter date 
is chosen to attenuate the effects of the Great 
Recession. 
2. If the take-up rate is lowered from an 
unreasonably large value of 100 percent to 80 
percent, the cost-per-job becomes $21,000. 
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